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Investment-driven growth has long been regarded as a key development strategy in China. This 
paper investigates empirically the validity of this view. Post-1990 data analyses and macro-
econometric model simulations show that market demand has become a regular force in driving 
investment since reforms, that non-demand-driven investment growth contributes to increasing 
capital-output ratio far more than output growth, that government investment exerts a pivotal role 
in amplifying investment cycles, albeit effective in promoting employment, and that delayed and 
rising consumption from current investment surge can help sustain the impact of growth even with 
constant-returns-to-scale in the long-run GDP. 
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By three methods we may learn wisdom: first, by reflection, which is 
noblest; second, imitation, which is easiest; and third by experience, which 
is the bitterest. 
Confucius 
 
I. Another East Asian ‘Miracle’? 
The spectacular growth of China over the last two decades apparently adds significant 
force to the East Asian ‘Miracle’.
1 During the period 1990 – 2003, China’s growth has been 
averaging 9.3% in terms of GDP per annum while the accompanying rate in gross fixed 
capital formation (GFCF) is 14% and the rate of the total investment in fixed assets (TIFA) 
is 15%.
2 Today, GFCF accounts for over 40% of nominal GDP, as compared to less than 
30% in the early 1980s, see Table 1.1. These records have definitely outperformed those of 
Japan and the US and many other Newly Industrialized Asian Economies (NIAEs), see 
Table 1.2. The GFCF growth also remains high especially when compared with other Asian 
economies, see Figure 1.1. In 2003 alone, GFCF recorded a growth of about 20% while 
TIFA growth reached 25%. 
In 2004, the startling acceleration of the TIFA – 43.2% growth in the 1
st quarter and 
33.3% in the 2
nd quarter
3 before settling down to 27.6% for the full year – has led the 
Chinese government to curtail fixed assets investment out of the grave concern that the 
rising investment would overheat the economy. The rapid investment expansion has caused 
severe shortage in energy and raw material supplies, pushed imports to grow faster than 
exports, and accelerated inflation. The investment price index rose to 5.6% and the 
                                                  
1 The East Asian ‘Miracle’ refers to the myth that the engine driving economic growth is essentially capital 
accumulation instead of total factor productivity growth, see e.g. (Young 1995) and (Senhadji 2000). 
2 The TIFA is more often used than the GFCF in China, as it is published monthly and more timely than 
GFCF. Both GFCF and TIFA are deflated by the price index of fixed assets from the China Statistical 
Yearbook 2004 for the period 1991-2003. The price index of raw materials and energy is used for 1990 as the 
price index of fixed assets is unavailable that year. 
3 All the statistics quoted are y-o-y rates.   2
consumer price index to 3.9% in 2004 as compared to 2.2% and 1.2% respectively in 2003. 
However, GDP growth ended up at about the same level as 2003 in spite of the investment 
fever and the tightening of investment policies. 
The view that the Chinese economy is an investment-driven economy is a legacy from 
the old regime of a centrally planned economy (CPE), e.g. see (Kornai 1980) for a general 
theory of investment hunger of a CPE and see (Imai 1994) for an investment-led business 
cycle model of China. And in spite of regime changes since the reforms, capital investment 
has remained to be regarded as a vital factor to promote the economic growth, as 
discernible from the recent literature. For example, Goldstein and Lardy (2004) anticipate 
that it will take a few years for the Chinese economy to unwind the current investment 
boom, possibly with a down turn, on the basis of the present investment curb. This 
investment-driven growth view also finds support in a number of empirical studies, e.g. see 
(Yu 1998), (Kwan et al 1999), and Zhang (2003).  
However, the view that investment is the main engine of growth faces several 
problems. Considering that the Chinese economy has undergone enormous changes since 
the reform, can we find enough evidence to support the assertion that the old investment-
driven mechanism is still intact? If the Chinese economy has remained in an investment-led 
track, why is it that the rate of GDP growth has always been significantly lower than the 
rate of investment growth over the last 15 years?
4 Why has the volatile investment cycles 
not discernibly affected the GDP growth path, as shown from Figure 1.2? If one seeks 
support of the view from levels rather than growth rates, how can we explain the visible 
increasing GFCF/GDP ratio, as shown in Table 1.1? The increasing ratio actually suggests 
                                                  
4 By simple growth theory, output growth is only expected to be dampened by the capital input elasticity in 
comparison with the capital input growth, e.g. see (Rebelo 1991). Using the estimated elasticity of 0.8, 9.3% of 
GDP growth should only require 11.6% growth in capital.   3
that the Chinese economy is another East Asian ‘miracle’.
5 If that is the case, how can we 
reconcile the contradiction between the view of investment-driven growth and the 
neoclassical growth theory, which states that accelerating capital accumulation alone 
cannot sustain long-run economic growth in the absence of significant technical progress? 
If we turn to new endogenous growth models for theoretical support, what are the 
identifiable variables which would link investment to growth, (see George et al 2003)? 
More fundamentally, one needs first to clearly define the investment-driven growth view as 
the investment-output nexus is by no means a one-way causal relationship according to 
endogenous growth theories. 
The paper makes an empirical attempt to answer the above problems using post-1990 
time-series data. We try to do this first by careful data analysis, see section 2. We then try 
to assess empirically the magnitude and the manner by which investment drives economic 
growth and vice versa. This we will do using a quarterly macro-econometric model of 
China where both investment and GDP are endogenously determined, see Section 3. 
Concluding remarks are in Section 4. 
II. What do data tell us about the investment-GDP nexus? 
In this section, we try to find answers to the questions posed in the previous section and 
to examine all the possibly identifiable aspects of the investment-driven-growth view with 
respect to aggregate investment and GDP data. Specifically, we to try to explain why 
surges in investment have not been significantly transmitted into GDP surges — whether it 
is investment growth or GDP growth which is dynamically leading the other, whether there 
                                                  
5 Evidence of overinvestment has also been presented in a number of recent publications, e.g. see (Zhang 
2003), (Lin 2004) and (Wolf 2005).   4
exists simultaneous causality between the two aggregates in levels, and whether there has 
been significant technological progress underlying the long-term growth. 
Let us first try to answer the question why the investment surge has not been 
significantly transmitted into GDP surge by analyzing the co-movement of the demand 
components of GDP with respect to the GFCF changes. Denote real GDP by Y, real 
consumption (including both private and government) by C, net exports by NX and 
inventory (or change in stocks) by IS. The income identity can thus be presented as 
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Figure 2.1 presents the weighted growth rates of the four components in the above equation 
alongside GDP growth rates using annual data for the period 1993-2003. It is discernible 
from the figure that the four component rates move in a closely substitutive manner such 
that their weighted average, i.e. the GDP growth rate, could remain at a relatively stable 
level. When GFCF accelerates, it squeezes either consumption, net exports or inventory 
which is very evident in recent years. There is a strong contemporaneous offsetting 
relationship among the GDP components to cushion the volatility impact of a single 
component on GDP, which is often neglected by analyses of the investment-GDP nexus 
based solely on the production side of the GDP. 
However, the above analysis is comparative static in nature and therefore cannot 
answer the question of whether GDP growth is dynamically led by investment growth or 
vice versa. To answer this question, we employ the commonly used method of Granger 
causality test, e.g. see Blomström et al (1996) and Ball et al (1996). Table 2.1 shows the 
Granger causality test results using both the growth rate of GFCF and the growth rate of   5
‘capital’, which is the accumulated investment net of depreciation, see equation (3) in the 
next section and also Appendix. The test results show strong evidence that investment 
growth and GDP growth do not Granger-cause each other and that the capital growth does 
not Granger-cause GDP growth either. But there is some weak evidence showing that GDP 
growth has been leading capital growth (the fourth lag of GDP growth in  Kc equation is 
significant at 10%). These significantly refute the postulate that GDP growth in China has 
been following investment growth. Notice that our finding does not contradict the previous 
findings by Ball et al (1996) and Blomstrom et al (1996)
6. 
Interestingly, the test results that investment growth might be led by economic growth 
seem corroborative to the neoclassical investment theory. This also implies that the old 
investment-driven-growth regime has been largely phased out at the macro level by 
reforms. Regrettably, the Granger-causality test only provides information concerning the 
sequential causal ordering of the variables. It does not tell us whether the variables are 
simultaneously causal. Moreover, the test disregards the possible bilateral relationship 
between levels of GDP and investment upon which most macroeconomic theories are 
based.
7 In order to examine interdependence between the levels of GDP and investment, we 
employ two methods. One is Johansen cointegration analysis, which will enable us to 
examine the long-run interdependence between nonstationary variables. The other is a 
comparison between maximum likelihood (ML) estimation of a simultaneous-equations 
model (SEM) and ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of the single equations of the 
                                                  
6 However, we are skeptical of the variable choice made by Blomstrom et al (1996), i.e. their choice of testing 
causality between real per capita income and ratio of fixed investment to GDP. 
7 Technically, Granger causality test requires the time-series variables involved to be stationary. As most of 
the level variables in macroeconomics exhibit strong nonstationary features, the test is commonly applied to 
growth rates of the variables.   6
model, which will enable us to examine contemporaneous interdependence, or simultaneity 
as commonly called in econometrics. 
Dickey-Fuller unit root test is carried out on GFCF, capital and GDP before Johansen 
cointegration analysis is applied. There is fairly strong evidence showing that GDP and 
GFCF are nonstationary I(1) variables from the test results (see Table 2.2). Being basically 
accumulated investment, capital should be an I(2) variable. However, we find no adequate 
evidence to show capital is I(2) rather than I(1). As unit root tests tend to have low power 
when sample sizes are relatively small, we shall apply cointegration analysis on two pairs 
of variables respectively, i.e. GDP versus GFCF and GDP versus capital, out of the 
consideration that it is capital stock, rather than investment, which forms a key component 
of aggregate production functions. It is evident from Table 2.3 that cointegration is not 
rejected for either pair of variables. We can thus be fairly confident that GDP and GFCF, as 
well as GDP and capital, are mutually interdependent in the long run, irrespective of the 
difficulty in determining the exact degrees of nonstationarity of each variables involved. 
Let us now examine whether the two pairs of variables are also contemporaneously 
interdependent. A simple two-equation VAR (vector autoregression) system is set up for 
this purpose. A SEM is then specified within the VAR and estimated first using ML 
estimator and then single-equation OLS estimators. Table 2.4 reports the estimation results. 
Set 1 in the table shows that GDP contemporaneously explains GFCF but not vice versa. In 
other words, GDP appears to be weakly exogenous to GFCF. Set 2 on the other hand 
indicates a fairly strong presence of simultaneity between capital and GDP (as ML 
estimates are very different from OLS estimates). Interestingly, the simultaneity in the 
GDP equation is essentially between GDP growth and capital growth which is roughly the 
GFCF (i.e. the coefficient estimates support a growth model). The OLS estimates in the   7
capital equation of set 2 are statistically similar to those ML estimates, reinforcing the 
above inference that GDP is weakly exogenous to capital or GFCF rather than vice versa. 
These results enhance the inferences based on the Granger causality test, and provide 
strong support to the claim that the Chinese economy is already out of the old investment-
led growth regime.  
The view of investment-driven growth also faces the theoretical challenge that long-
term growth is independent of capital accumulation, unless there exist either increasing 
returns to scale due to capital or technological progress. Empirical evidence shows that 
increasing returns to capital is normally long-run untenable, see e.g. (Temple 1999). To 
examine whether there has been significant technological progress underlying China’s 
economic growth, we utilize the long-run GDP equation proposed by He and Qin (2004), 
which assumes that the long-run GDP follow a simple Cobb-Douglas production function 
with constant returns to scale. If there were significant technological progress, the actual 
GDP de-trended by this long-run GDP should carry a visible upward trend. The actual 
GDP, the long-run GDP and the de-trended GDP are plotted in Figure 2.2. Interestingly, 
the de-trended GDP shows a slow cycle, with a significant downward movement since the 
late 1990s, corresponding to the noticeable rise in the GFCF/GDP ratio as shown in Table 
1.1. Thus, we do not reject the constant return to scale assumption — long-run economic 
growth may not be dependent upon investment growth. 
III. What does macroeconometric model tell us about the investment-GDP nexus? 
The data evidence of the previous section shows that in comparative static terms, there 
are counterbalancing demand factors that offset the impact of investment volatility on 
GDP; that, in the long run, there has not been discernable trend of long-lasting 
technological progress to reject the constant return to scale condition; and that there is   8
fairly strong evidence of simultaneity between investment and GDP although the causal 
direction in terms of growth rates is more of GDP → investment than vice versa. However, 
examination of data alone is inadequate for us to synthesize the above results and to 
evaluate how much and in what way investment drives GDP growth both in the short run 
and in the long run. To achieve these, one has to resort to the use of macro models. 
A common type of macro model for this purpose is the endogenous or semi-
endogenous growth model, see (George et al 2003) for a recent survey and (Li 2000) for 
semi-endogenous growth models. However, most of these models are still too theoretical 
and too abstract to enable sound empirical inferences. For example, Agénor (2000, Chapter 
13) points out how growth models are plagued by methodological problems in applications; 
Temple (2003) warns applied economists against taking growth models too literally. 
Therefore, we choose to use a full-fledged macro-econometric model of China as it is more 
comprehensive and closer to the Chinese economy than any growth-theory based structural 
models. The China model is a quarterly model built by the Economics and Research 
Department of Asian Development Bank jointly with the Institute of World Economics and 
Politics of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The model contains 75 endogenous 
variables and 16 non-modeled variables. It is estimated based on a data sample starting 
from 1992Q1, see (He et al 2004) and (Qin et al 2005) for more detailed description of the 
model and our modeling strategy. 
As the investment-GDP nexus is the present focus, this entails a brief description of the 
investment block and the output block of the model.
8 There are four key equations in this 
                                                  
8 The basic structure of the investment block is first reported in He and Qin (2004). However, the block has 
been substantially revised since that paper was written, due mainly to changes in the data series used for 
aggregate investment. The current model uses the TIFA as the sum of government budgetary investment and 
business sector investment (see the Appendix). However, the sum of the TIFA and FDI is generally smaller 
than GFCF, though the two series have very similar dynamic patterns.   9
block: the first three equations explain government budgetary investment, business sector 
investment, and foreign direct investment (FDI) respectively, and the last equation links 
aggregate investment (i.e. the sum of government budgetary investment, business sector 
investment and FDI) to GFCF in the GDP expenditure composition. Capital stock is 
derived from GFCF. As for the output block, GDP is explained via its three sectors: the 
primary sector, the secondary sector and the tertiary sector.
9 
Theoretically, the investment-output nexus can be summarized as follows: the expected 
output, 
e
t Y , depends on both supply and demand factors: 
(2)   () t t t
e
t L K f Y Φ =  
where  K and L represent capital and labor input respectively, and Φ denotes demand 
factors. The expected investment, 
e
t I , is dependent upon factor input demand and other 
institutional factors, Ψ: 













Y f K K I δ 1  
where ∆ denotes difference, δ is the depreciation rate, and PK and PY are the prices of 
capital and output respectively. Qin and Song (2003) show that (3) can be derived from 
minimizing the cost of an aggregate production function, where the cost function is 
augmented by soft-budget constraints to characterize institutional features related to 
government investment decisions. He and Qin (2004) find that changes in government 
investment exert important institutional impact on business sector investment even though 
the latter now follows closely the standard capital input demand theory in the long run.  
                                                  
9 The three sectors are frequently referred to as ‘agriculture’, ‘industry’ and ‘services’ sectors for 
convenience, though these names do not rigorously fit the statistical definition.   10
Two issues are in need of clarification with equation (2). First, it does not contain an 
explicit technological progress factor. This is due to two reasons. One is data evidence, i.e. 
the lack of observable long-run trend shown in Figure 2.2 of the previous section. The other 
is the lack of robust empirical evidence identifying total factor productivity, see e.g. (Chen 
1997), (Easterly and Levine 2002) and (Carlaw and Lipsey 2003). One alternative is to 
endogenize technological progress with respect to capital, as widely adopted in endogenous 
growth theories. For example, King and Robson (1993) assume that it is a nonlinear 
function of It. Since the dynamics of It is adequately incorporated in the econometric 
specification of the equations corresponding to (3), our model has not ruled out the 
possibility of investment-led technological changes.
10 The second issue is concerned with 
the feasibility of a production function dominant output equation to explain the output of 
the three sectors individually. Apart from data unavailability with respect to disaggregate 
capital inputs, it is questionable whether output of services is dominantly supply driven. In 
the China model, only the secondary sector follows a long-run production function. The 
other two sectors are explained mainly from the demand side, considering that labor input 
does not serve as a constraint to either sector. A more detailed sketch of the output block, 
as well as the investment block of the China model is given in Figure 3.1. 
In general, structural equations of the parsimonious error-correction model (ECM) type 
are obtained on the basis of (2) and (3) via the dynamic specification approach, see 
(Hendry 1995). Most of the variables are in natural logarithm and the variable set, {x}, is 
divided into endogenous variables, y, and non-modeled variables, z: 
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10 The growth rate of capital stock is found to exert a small, positive role in the secondary sector output 
equation of the current the China model.   11
where  d denotes a set of dummy variables including the constant term and seasonal 
dummies, n denotes the minimum lag to make the residual term, ut, white noise, and where 
a priori theory, such as (2) and (3), is embedded in the long-run error/equilibrium term, 
x Π .  
In order to find out how investment and output drive each other dynamically within a 
macro model comprised of mainly estimated equations of the type like (4), we resort to the 
method of impulse response function (IRF) , e.g. see (Dungey and Pagan 2000). The IRF 
method exploits the equivalence between (4) and a moving average representation in terms 
of the error term, u. When an econometric model is built to comprise mainly of structural 
equations, the error term associated with a structural equation is often interpreted as the 
‘structural’ shock to the endogenous variable of that equation, e.g. see (Wickens and Motto 
2001). This enables applied modelers to use IRF to trace how every single endogenous 
variable in a model reacts to a random shock associated with one particular endogenous 
variable. When a macro-econometric model contains more than a few behavioral equations, 
it is virtually impossible to solve the IRFs analytically. It is then common to get the IRFs 
via model simulation. In particular, the IRF for n periods, using the estimated model, M ˆ , 
with respect to a shock from the ith equation to the jth variable is defined as:  
(5)     ( ) ( )
() M j u u u y E
M u u u u y E M n IRF
n t t t n t j
i k n t i t i t i n t j
ˆ 0 |
ˆ 0 , 0 , 0 , | ˆ
1 ,
, 1 , , ,
∀ = = = = −
= = = = =
+ + +




where the impulse shock, δ, is commonly taken as the estimated standard deviation of ui.  
Two technical issues are disregarded in our IRF simulations due to model-size induced 
technical complexity. The first is residual orthogonalization. The structural interpretation of 
a shock depends on the condition that the error term concerned should be uncorrelated with 
the error terms of other relevant structural equations. Instead of orthogonalizing the huge   12
residual matrix of the model, we simply check the sample covariance of those residuals 
relevant to our IRF simulations. In most cases, the covariance is negligibly small. The 
second issue is estimating confidence intervals for the IRFs. Although various methods are 
available, it is practically infeasible for us to implement them on a model of this size.  
Three sets of IRFs are simulated to examine how much investment shocks impact on 
the output. The first corresponds to a government budgetary investment shock, the second 
to the business sector investment shock and the third to the combined shocks of the first 
two. The results of IRFs relating to the major variables are illustrated in Figures 3.2, 3.3 
and 3.4 respectively. In these figures, all the level variables are divided by population, 
which is exogenous in the model to facilitate the interpretation of the simulation results 
with respect to growth theories.  
Several interesting observations can be made out of these IRF graphs. First, there is a 
visible, though very small, lasting output gain from one-off investment shocks. Roughly, a 
10% one-off increase in GFCF generates around 0.05% long-term GDP growth (see the 
average as well as the end-of-sample value of GDPc in Figure 3.4). Second, the growth is 
predominantly from the secondary sector (i.e. GDP growth path closely follows secondary 
sector growth path), followed by a rising tertiary sector output. The primary sector enjoys 
the least growth from the investment shocks. Third, the increase in the output of the tertiary 
sector is accompanied by a decline in unemployment and a subsequent rise in private 
consumption, implying certain long-term welfare gain of the shocks. This also shows that 
the long-term growth effect can be sustained by enhanced, though delayed, demand factors, 
even in the absence of technological progress (i.e. the graphs in the bottom right panels of   13
these figures show no discernible upward movement to indicate technological progress)
11. 
Fourth, government investment plays a pivotal role in the increase in output even though its 
one-off increase is roughly equivalent to 0.4% GFCF shock, its long-term output impact is 
as large as a 9.4% GFCF shock from the business sector investment. This is because an 
increase in government investment signals expansionary fiscal policy to the economy, 
invoking stronger growth in GFCF in the subsequent years (see Figure 3.2). Finally, there 
are visible lags of reaction as well as substantial dampening of the initial investment shocks 
(if the scales of volatility between the IRFs of GDP and GFCF are compared), which 
further explains why investment volatilities are not visible in the output volatilities, 
especially the simultaneous volatilities. 
Since the increase in private consumption appears to play a crucial role in sustaining 
the long-term GDP growth in the above scenarios, we experiment on a scenario where the 
initial shock comes from private consumption in order to see if such a shock has similar 
growth effect, see Figure 3.5. It is discernible from the IRFs in Figure 3.5 that the answer is 
negative. A one-off increase in private consumption exerts no permanent effect on GDP 
growth. This is not very surprising though as a one-off consumption increase does not have 
the cumulative effect that a one-off investment increase has via capital stock. 
Next, we simulate four sets of IRFs to output shocks. The first three sets correspond to 
an impulse shock of the primary sector, the secondary sector and the tertiary sectors 
respectively. The last set corresponds to combined shocks of these three sectors. The IRFs 
of GFCF as well as the government investment and business investment are plotted in 
Figure 3.6. In order to make the effects comparable across sectors, we normalized the 
effects of sectoral shocks in Figure 3.6 by converting each sector shock into an equivalent 
                                                  
11 GDP/GDPLR in the bottom right panel is the de-trended GDP defined in Figure 2.2 and discussed in 
section II.   14
1% GDP growth shock.
12 Notice that the output shocks virtually have no permanent effect 
on investment. More interestingly, the volatilities that the output shocks induce on 
investment variables are far smaller than those induced by investment shocks on output 
variables. In particular, the primary sector is the sector that invokes the largest output-led 
temporary investment spikes among the three sectors, whereas the temporary output rise in 
the secondary and the tertiary sectors even results in negative investment demand in the 
long run. In other words, only the agricultural sector appears relatively in need of further 
investment. This is mainly due to the fact that nominal responses to each shock differ 
across sectors because of different implicit impact on the three sectoral deflators, which 
transmits onto various prices and interest rates. Figure 3.7 illustrates these differences 
embodied in inflation (both in terms of consumer price and investment price indices), 
nominal and real lending rates. It is discernible from the figure that agriculture is the only 
sector whose shock dampens the real lending rate to stimulate investment. Taken as a 
whole, the simulation results suggest that output-led investment is far more efficient than 
autonomous investment rises if judged on the basis of relative incremental changes of 
investment versus output growth. In other words, if investment depends purely on factor 
input demand as shown in equation (2), less investment would be needed to sustain the 
growth. The existing capacity in the economy appears to have room for further growth 
without investment growth, e.g. see similar views by Wolf (2005). 
The IRF results clearly show why the recent investment boom in China has not been 
transmitted into the country’s GDP growth and why GDP growth has been more or less 
                                                  
12 After the normalization, the primary sector impulse shock generates roughly a 5% temporary rise and 
0.25% permanent rise in GFCF; the secondary sector shock generates roughly a 2% temporary rise and 0.1% 
permanent fall in GFCF; the tertiary sector shock generates 2% temporary rise and 0.04% permanent fall in 
GFCF.   15
immune to investment fevers. It also substantiates the data evidences presented in the 
previous section.  
Would the recent investment boom have occurred if the economy did not encounter any 
autonomous policy changes or internal shocks? To examine this we run a model forecast 
for the period 2002Q1 to 2004Q4 and assumed zero shocks for all equations, with the 
domestic and exogenous variables following their 2001 dynamics, and allowed the world 
exogenous variables to take their observed values. The forecasted values of key variables 
are plotted in Figure 3.8, together with the actual values. As seen from this figure, the 
economy would have run slightly smoother, the GDP would have grown at 8.4% on 
average instead of 9%, and the growth in GFCF would have been 18% instead of above 
21% on average for the three years. It appears that GDP growth is certainly hardly affected 
by a much reduced investment speed (about 15% drop). 
IV. Conclusions 
This paper assesses empirically the validity of the belief that the Chinese economy still 
follows largely the investment-led growth paradigm. The paradigm is scrutinized from 
several aspects of the investment-output nexus: the lead-lag relationship between the 
growth rates of the pair, the simultaneity and long-run interdependency between the pair in 
levels, and the combined long-run and short-run interactions between them when both are 
endogenized within a macroeconometric model. The effects of investment are considered 
not only as GFCF flows but also as cumulated capital stock. Furthermore, the nexus is 
examined at a disaggregate level by means of impulse response function analysis of a 
macroeconometric model. Specifically, the dynamics of the nexus is examined through the 
impacts of random shocks via government budgetary investment, business sector 
investment, as well as three output sectors.   16
The data analyses and model simulations yield a number of interesting results with 
important policy implications:  
1.  Empirical results show the existence of a long-run positive relationship between 
investment and economic growth, but the causality runs from the latter to the 
former. In other words, the growth of capital stock and/or growth of investment 
does not lead or exogenously drive output growth regularly either in short run or in 
long run. Rather, it is output that drives investment demand in the economy. This 
implies the applicability of market-based growth theories. 
2.  Analysis of the long-run GDP trend shows that the Chinese economy has not been 
an exception to the East Asian ‘miracle’, in the sense that there lacks evidence of 
noticeably long-lasting technological progress to refute the constant return to scale 
condition in the long run. Indeed, rapid investment growth has resulted in rising 
capital-output ratio rather than output growth acceleration — another reason why 
investment is not really driving growth. 
3.  Rising capital-output ratio indicates the problem of overinvestment, a problem 
impinging on the issue of investment efficiency at a macro level. The severity of the 
problem is further highlighted by the model simulation results. Specifically, the 
investment growth to output growth ratio is significantly higher when the random 
shock originates from investment than when the shock originates from output; a 
random increase of investment leads to further rise in capital-output ratio over a 
long period. Overinvestment in the sense of increasing investment irrespective of 
output expectations would give rise to more efficiency loss and structural imbalance 
in the economy than to more economic growth, especially when there is surplus   17
capital capacity. This helps explain why investment-led overheating would heat 
inflation far more easily than output. 
4.  The model simulation results at the sectoral level shed further light to the above 
point. Among the three sectors, agriculture is the sector whose growth would 
demand the highest investment incremental. In contrast, the secondary sector can 
sustain further growth even with a slight reduction in investment, implying that 
surplus capital capacity is more prevalent in this sector. 
5.  Disaggregate model simulation on the investment side also shows that the 
government budgetary investment plays a key role in generating investment fever, 
i.e. overinvestment irrespective of output expectations. As government investment 
serves as an important signal of fiscal policy, a small increase could trigger sizeable 
domestic investment expansion, resulting in a much amplified investment 
oscillation. The ensuing long-run overcapacity in terms of GDP gap can be more 
severe than that induced by an increase originated from the business-sector 
investment. On the other hand, the positive effect of government investment on 
GDP growth endorses the recent theoretical studies on fiscal policy and economic 
growth, e.g. see (Zagler and Dürnecker 2003). It raises an importance issue of how 
policy makers should balance the goals of reducing unemployment and enhancing 
aggregate efficiency in investment and capital utilization. In principle, policy 
makers need to give far more attention to the efficiency/productivity of investment 
than to the magnitude of investment; they should provide the enabling environment 
that would allow the economy to take advantage of expanded opportunities. This 
entails sound measures to encourage technological progress and human capital 
improvement, to enhance existing capacity utilization and to balance development   18
strategies among sectors, as well as to speed up capital market and banking sector 
reforms. 
6.  Nevertheless, the view that investment drives output growth is verified in one 
aspect, namely that a one-off increase in aggregate investment could generate 
relatively long-lasting impact on the growth of output, albeit very small. More 
interestingly, the growth is sustained by a much lagged rising consumption 
response. This result reveals the long-term welfare gain that investment shocks 
could generate, a practically more important issue, but somewhat less investigated, 
than the existence of long-run balance growth, see (Temple 2003). It also shows 
how the consumption side of an economy can play an important role, an area not 
yet adequately explored in growth theories, see (George et al 2003). Moreover, it 
offers a plausible way of demystifying the East Asian ‘miracle’. Therefore, it 
appears right to say ‘yes’ to the investment-led growth view under this 




This paper is an extension of a short piece, originally written by Qin and Quising as a 
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grateful to G. Ducanes, S.-G. Liu, and N. Magtibay-Ramos for their substantial help in 
developing the ADB China model. Thanks should also be extended to participants of 
EcoMod2005 Conference, where the paper was presented and received helpful 
comments.    19
Appendix: Data Description and Sources 
  




BINV      Business Sector Investment      The total investment in fixed assets (TIFA) net of the 
government investment (see below)  CMEI   
 
FDI    Foreign  Direct  Investment    FDI  (Actually  utilized),  CMEI 
 
  GCF      Gross Capital Formation      Identity: GCFC + IS   
  
GCON      Government Consumption      Computed from nominal annual data in CSY with 
seasonal interpolations provided by NSBC   
  GDP      Gross Domestic Product      CMEI   
  GDPLR      Long-run GDP      Computed by Identity in the China Model   
  
GFCF      Gross Fixed Capital Formation      Interpolated from nominal annual data in CSY using 
the seasonal patterns of TIFA   
  
GINV      Government investment      Sum of expenditure for capital construction and 
innovation funds of enterprises from the table of the 
government budgetary expenditures, CMEI   
  IRL%      Lending Rate      PBC   
 
IS            Computed from nominal annual data in CSY with 
seasonal interpolations provided by NSBC   
  
K      Capital      Computed by equation (3); the depreciation rate is 
taken as 5% quarterly in the China Model   
  M2      Broad Money      PBC   
  
M      Imports      Converted from nominal  data in $  into RMB by spot 
exchange rate, CMEI   
  P#C      Consumer Price Index      Deflator for GCON and PCON, CMEI   
  P#GDP    GDP  deflator    CMEI   
  P#INV      Investment Price Index      Deflator for investment series, CMEI   
  
PCON      Private Consumption      Computed from nominal annual data in CSY with 
seasonal interpolations provided by NSBC   
  TIFA            The total investment in fixed assets, CMEI   
  
UEMP%      Unemployment Rate      Computed from labor force and employment; these 
two series are computed from CSY   
  
VA1      Value Added from the Primary 
Sector 
  CMEI 
 
  
VA2      Value Added from the Secondary 
Sector 
  CMEI 
 
  
VA3      Value Added from the Tertiary 
Sector 
  CMEI 
 
  
X      Exports      Converted from nominal  data in $  into RMB by spot 
exchange rate, CMEI   
All data series are quarterly. To denote variables of constant price, a lower case ‘c’ is added at the end of the 
variable names.
 
* CMEI stands for China Monthly Economic Indicators. CSY stands for China Statistical Yearbook. NSBC 
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Table 1.1 China's Investment Ratios, 1978-2004 
 
Year  GFCF % to 
GDP 
GCF % to 
GDP    Year  GFCF% to 
GDP 
GCF % to 
GDP 
           
1978 29.8  38.2    1992  32.2  37.3 
1979 28.3  36.2    1993  37.6  43.5 
1980 29.0  34.9    1994  36.1  41.3 
1981 25.6  32.3    1995  34.7  40.8 
1982 27.2  32.1    1996  34.2  39.3 
1983 28.1  33.0    1997  33.6  38.0 
1984 29.7  34.5    1998  35.0  37.4 
1985 30.0  38.5    1999  35.7  37.1 
1986 30.6  38.0    2000  36.5  36.4 
1987 31.8  36.7    2001  37.3  38.0 
1988 31.4  37.4    2002  38.9  39.2 
1989 26.4  37.0    2003  42.2  42.3 
1990  25.8  35.2    2004   /a  44.0  44.1 
1991 27.9  35.3         
AVERAGE             32.6 37.5 
           
a/   ADB Staff Estimate         
Note: GCF denotes GFCF plus inventory or change in stocks; 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2004; "Stable and Rapid  Development of the National 
Economy in 2004" available at http://www/stats.gov.cn; ADB Database 
 
 
Table 1.2 Average Investment Ratios for Selected Economies 
  
GFCF % to GDP  GCF % to GDP 
 Sample:  1978—2004 
Hong Kong, China  27.2  28.4 
Korea, Rep of  30.7  31.1 
Singapore       35.5  36.0 
Taiwan 20.0  20.6 
USA               15.9  19.8 
 Sample:  1980—2004 
Japan      27.7  28.0 
Source: CEIC Data Company Ltd. 
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Table 2.1 Granger-Causality tests on GFCF & GDP and Capital & GDP 
Endogenous Variable  F-statistic   Lag coefficients 
Investment and GDP growth rates (in real terms) 
      GDPc(-1)  GDPc(-2)   GDPc(-3)   GDPc(-4) 
 GFCFc  0.9892 1.5596  -0.585  -2.2139  0.7603 
    [0.4280]  (1.3950)  (1.4860) (1.5600) (1.4280) 
      GFCFc(-1)  GFCFc(-2)   GFCFc(-3)   GFCFc(-4) 
 GDPc  1.3944  0.0235  0.0185 -0.0056 0.0283 
   [0.2589]  (0.0250)  (0.0194) (0.0188) (0.0186) 
Capital and GDP growth rates (in real terms) 
      GDPc(-1)  GDPc(-2)   GDPc(-3)   GDPc(-4) 
 Kc  2.6077 0.0392  -0.0337  0.0052  0.1929 
   [0.0547]  (0.1004)  (0.1068)  (0.1107)  (0.0934)* 
      Kc(-1)   Kc(-2)   Kc(-3)   Kc(-4) 
 GDPc  1.3117  0.0752  -0.0233 -0.0513 -0.0733 
   [0.2874]  (0.2175)  (0.3519) (0.3302) (0.1773) 
Note:   indicates growth rate. Statistics in parentheses are standard errors while those in brackets 
are probabilities. Those marked by ‘*’ are significant at 5% level.  F-statistic indicates no 
granger-causality between GFCF growth and GDP growth or capital growth and GDP growth. 
GDP growth marginally granger-causes capital growth (the significant level is 5.5%).  
 
 
Table 2.2 Dickey-Fuller (DF) and Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit-root tests 
Full sample  Sub-sample   
DF  
[-2.92 at 5%] 
ADF(3)  
[-2.93 at 5%] 
DF 
[-2.94 at 5%] 
ADF(3)  
[-2.94 at 5%] 
() GDPc ln 4 ∆   -2.508 -2.919 -4.112  -3.601 
() GFCFc ln 4 ∆   -5.004 -3.462 -4.843 -1.95 
() Kc ln 4 ∆   -2.823 -6.368  -0.8857  -1.245 
() GDPc ln   -1.423 -4.619  -0.6333  -1.071 
() GFCFc ln   -1.793 -1.531 -1.366  -2.616 
() Kc ln   1.889 -0.2317 -2.147 -4.791 
Note: Full sample for GDPc: 1992 – 2004, for GFCFc and Kc: 1992 – 2003; Sub-sample cuts off the first 
three years: 1992 – 1994. Seasonal dummies are included for all the level variable tests. Critical 
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Table 2.3 Cointegration Analysis 
Model includes:  Constant & Seasonals  Constant, Trend & Seasonals 
Set 1. GFCF and GDP 
rank = 0      
   Trace test  33.16**  48.77** 
   Maximum Eigenvalue test  29.54**  36.44** 
rank = 1      
   Trace test  3.63  12.34 
   Maximum Eigenvalue test  3.63  12.34 
Unit Root test on residuals       
   Durbin-Watson  2.44  2.26 
   t-ADF  -8.866**  -6.528** 
Set 2. Capital and GDP 
rank = 0      
   Trace test  56.37  64.20** 
   Maximum Eigenvalue test  55.67  60.85** 
rank = 1    
   Trace test  0.7  3.35 
   Maximum Eigenvalue test  0.7  3.35 
Unit Root test on residuals       
   Durbin-Watson  2.41  1.92 
   t-ADF  7.120**  -4.763** 
Note: There is at least one cointegrating equation for GFCF and GDP and capital and GDP.  Due to 
small sample size, some residuals were found to be non-stationary depending on the number
of lags included in the ADF test. For the purposes of this study, only the results which include 
lags that render the t-ADF statistics significant are reported. 
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Table 2.4 Simultaneous equations VAR model versus Single equations OLS Model
Endogenous 
Variable  Coefficients 
Set 1. GFCF and GDP 
Simultaneous equations VAR model 
   GDPc(-1) GFCFc  GFCFc(-1) Constant Seasonal(1) Seasonal(3) 
GDPc  1.0504 -0.0481 -0.0034 -0.1943 -0.7288  -0.1503 
   (0.0423)*  (0.0506) (0.0282) (0.2314)  (0.1037)*  (0.0283)* 
   GFCFc(-1) GDPc  GDPc(-1) Constant  Seasonal(1) Seasonal(3) 
GFCFc  0.0611 4.6497 -3.3158 -6.9182 1.1044  -0.4237 
   (0.1992)  (0.4800)* (0.5658)* (1.6240)* (0.2937)*  (0.1335)* 
OLS model 
   GDPc(-1) GFCFc  GFCFc(-1) Constant Seasonal(1) Seasonal(3) 
GDPc  1.0243 -0.0108 -0.0219 0.2950 -0.6528  -0.1302 
   (0.0274)*  (0.0230) (0.0168) (0.1909)  (0.0480)*  (0.0144)* 
   INVc(-1) GDPc GDPc(-1) Constant  Seasonal(1) Seasonal(2) 
GFCFc  0.0506 4.0685 -2.7202 -6.9001 0.7702  -0.3797 
   (0.1948)  (0.4390)* (0.5265)* (1.5880)* (0.2708)*  (0.1300)* 
Set 2. Capital and GDP 
Simultaneous equations VAR model 
   GDPc(-1) Kc  Kc(-1) Constant  Seasonal(1) Seasonal(3) 
GDPc  1.0842 -0.9150 0.8657 -0.1193 -0.7318  -0.1611 
   (0.0985)* (0.4679) (0.4177)* (0.5251) (0.0547)*  (0.0189)* 
   Kc(-1) GDPc  GDPc(-1) Constant  Seasonal(1) Seasonal(2) 
Kc  0.7924 0.1868 0.2007 -2.1100  -0.0191  0.0532 
   (0.0206)* (0.0365)* (0.0609)* (0.1931)*  (0.0249)  (0.0114)* 
OLS model 
   GDPc(-1) Kc  Kc(-1) Constant  Seasonal(1) Seasonal(3) 
GDPc  0.9762 -0.3871 0.3947 0.4507 -0.6710  -0.1410 
   (0.0534)*  (0.2377) (0.2125) (0.2899)  (0.0287)*  (0.0109)* 
   Kc(-1) GDPc  GDPc(-1) Constant  Seasonal(2) Seasonal(3) 
Kc  0.7863 0.1594 0.2389 -2.1594  -0.0370  0.0582 
   (0.0202)* (0.0341)* (0.0580)* (0.1903)*  (0.0234)  (0.0111)* 
Note:  Statistics in parentheses are standard errors. Those marked by ‘*’ are significant at the 5% level. 
GFCF is not significant to GDP in set 1.  Capital is significant to GDP in set 2 with different 
coefficients for the simultaneous and OLS models implying interdependence with GDP.  GDP is 
however found to be weakly exogenous to investment (set 1) and capital (set 2).   
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Source: CEIC Data Company Ltd.; China Statistical Yearbook, 2004 
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Data source: See the Appendix. 
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Note:  Weighted growth rates of the components are presented here alongside GDP growth. 
Source: CMEI for GDP and components in levels 
 
 


















GDP net of LR
 
Note: GDP net of LR refers to detrended GDP which is taken as the ratio between GDP and GDPLR. 
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Figure 3.1 Framework of output and investment blocks of the China Model 
 
where:
BINVc = f (GDP, Government investment)
FDI = f ( Differential interest rates, Trade openness, Relative prices )
User cost of capital,
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VA1c = f ( Income, Relative Prices, Sector Structural Shifts )
(demand side function) (additional short-run factor)
VA2c = f ( Capital, Labor, Sector Structural Shifts )
(supply side function) (additional short-run factor)
VA3c = f ( Income, Relative Prices, Sector Structural Shifts )









VA1c = f ( Income, Relative Prices, Sector Structural Shifts )
(demand side function) (additional short-run factor)
VA2c = f ( Capital, Labor, Sector Structural Shifts )
(supply side function) (additional short-run factor)
VA3c = f ( Income, Relative Prices, Sector Structural Shifts )
(supply side function) (additional short-run factor)  29
 
Figure 3.2 Impulse response function to government investment (GINVc) shock  



























































































Note: The experiment is carried out for an 11-year (44 quarters) period. The impulse is imposed at quarter 5 
and there are 40 quarters of response time. The unit of the vertical axis is in percentage. All the level 
variables are divided by population. The curves capture the difference of annual growth rates of the 
variables concerned and the  µ ’s are estimated average values. See the appendix for detailed 
definitions of the variables. The current impulse generates roughly a 0.4%↑ GFCFc shock. 
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Figure 3.3 Impulse response function to the business sector investment (BINVc) shock  
































































































   31
 
Figure 3.4 Impulse response function to the combined investment shocks 
























































































Note: The same as the note of Figure 3.2. The current impulse generates roughly a 9.8%↑ GFCFc shock. 
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Figure 3.5 Impulse response function to the private consumption shocks 

























































































Note: The same as the note of Figure 3.2.  
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Figure 3.6 Impulse response function to GDPc impulse shock  
1
st row: 1 s.d. shock from VA1c generates roughly 0.044% ↑ GDP shock  
2
nd row: 1 s.d. shock from VA2c generates roughly 1.17% ↑ GDP shock  
3
rd row: 1 s.d. shock from VA3c generates roughly 0.45% ↑ GDP shock 
4





































































Note: Refer to the note of Figure 3.2. The number added to the variable notation indicates the sector where 
shock is originated. To make the three sector shocks comparable, all the IRFs are rescaled to correspond to 
1% of GDPc growth. 
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Figure 3.7  Nominal response to impulse shocks of the three sectors 






















0.2 Real lending rate
 
Note: The unit of the vertical axis is in percentage. Inflation is calculated as y-o-y growth rates. See Figure 
3.6 for the details of the impulse shock scenarios.   35
 
Figure 3.8 Forecasted versus actual growth for 2002Q1 – 2004Q4   
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